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Introduction 
Ebola virus is one of the most virulent human pathogens. Since 1976, Ebola virus disease 
(EVD) has caused more than 20 outbreaks in Africa, with case fatality rates of 30%-90%, in 
the absence of any approved treatment or vaccination [1]. It is transmitted by direct contact 
through broken skin or mucous membranes with blood, urine, saliva, feces, vomit, and other 
body fluids of symptomatic infected patients or convalescent persons, or through 
contaminated needle sticks [1, 2]. The current outbreak in West Africa probably begun in 
December 2013 in Guinea [3], and causes unprecedented concerns for the following reasons: 
i) It is due to a strain with 97% homology with Zaire ebolavirus, the most virulent species, 
with prior fatality rates as high as 90% ; ii) As of August 22nd, four countries have been 
involved, with 2,615 suspected cases, 1,528 laboratory confirmed cases, and 1,427 related 
deaths: this is already much more than the largest epidemic reported to date (425 cases in 
Uganda, 2000-2001), and the situation is unlikely to be resolved soon [4, 5]; iii) The 2014 
West Africa outbreak affects rural as well as urban areas, and recently reached the most 
populous African country (Nigeria); iv) Experienced governmental and non-governmental 
organizations, including Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), have been active on the field since 
March 2014 [3], but failed to control the epidemic.  
Many factors contributed to this failure, including population poverty and authorities’ 
distrust , disease denial in the context of strong religious beliefs, porous borders, weaknesses 
in public health systems, inadequate salaries and lack of adequate protection for health care 
workers. On August 8, nine months after the first documented cases, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) has declared this outbreak a public health emergency of international 
concern and has called for a strong and coordinated international response, stating that ‘all 
nations should be prepared to detect, investigate, and manage Ebola cases’ [6].  
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Ebola virus disease outside Africa 
The risk that this outbreak will establish a foothold in high-income countries outside 
Africa is very low, as human-to-human transmission of EVD does not occur when adequate 
infection control procedures are implemented. However, patients with EVD acquired in West 
Africa have already been transferred to America and Europe, and this is likely to become 
more common as the disease spreads. Hence, physicians working in emergency departments 
or intensive care units (ICU) outside Africa must be able to identify patients with possible 
EVD, and manage them appropriately, with two main objectives: i) prevent any human-to-
human transmission of Ebola virus in contacts, including health care workers, relatives, and 
other patients; ii) ensure all EVD suspected patients receive appropriate care, whether or not 
affected. We aimed to describe epidemiological, clinical and biological clues that may be used 
to classify patients with suspected EVD. 
 
Epidemiological clues 
As of August 2014, EVD has been essentially transmitted in three countries during the current 
outbreak: Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (Fig. 1). A fourth country, Nigeria, was more 
recently added to the list of countries where transmission of Ebola virus occurs, which 
documents that spread may occur in countries not bordering the original epidemic area. For 
case definition, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) consider that residence 
in, or travel to an area where EVD transmission is active, is a risk factor for EVD 
(http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/hcp/case-definition.html). Although this makes sense for 
operational reasons, two issues deserve consideration. Firstly, outbreaks are dynamic 
processes, and this is particularly true for this EVD epidemic. Hence, we have no guarantee 
that countries bordering with areas of active transmission (e.g. Mali, Ivory Coast), or even 
more remote African countries, will remain EVD-free. This remark is not an invitation to 
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prematurely increase the list of countries to be considered at risk for EVD exposure, but a 
word of caution to governments and clinicians: in the context of the current outbreak, a 
patient returning from countries neighbouring those mentioned above, and presenting with 
fever, a severe illness, haemorrhagic symptoms, and no alternative diagnosis, should raise 
attention. Secondly, in subjects coming back from one of the four EVD countries, the level of 
exposure may differ from almost zero (e.g. airlines staff or passengers in transit who spent a 
few hours in a local airport), to very high (e.g. health care staff working in an Ebola treatment 
unit). 
 The second epidemiological clue is the incubation time or window period, 
conservatively defined as [3-21 days]. These limits allow to rule out EVD in any patient with 
fever onset later than 21 days after returning from an endemic area. More reliable data, 
obtained in settings where a single well-defined exposure had occurred, indicated a range of 
3-13 days for the incubation period (mean, 6-8 days). However, the mean incubation period 
may vary according to the inoculum and the route of infection, averaging at 9.5 days for 
contact exposures, and 6.3 days after injection during the 1976 Zaire ebolavirus outbreak [7, 
8].     
    
Clinical findings suggestive of Ebola virus disease 
High-grade fever is a necessary criteria for EVD in most case definitions. Indeed, in all 
published series, fever was present in > 97% of cases [1, 2, 9-19], and a literature review 
found that 791 of 796 cases of EVD presented with a body temperature > 101°F, or 38.3°C 
[9]. Typically, fever is of abrupt onset, associated with flu-like symptoms (chills, malaise, 
arthromyalgias), and soon followed by digestive manifestations [1, 2]. In the current West 
Africa outbreak, severe diarrhea and vomiting have been invariably observed during the early 
disease course [3]. Subsequent signs and symptoms are variable, mostly respiratory (chest 
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pain, shortness of breath, cough), cutaneous (in 25-50% of cases, a mostly non-itchy, diffuse 
maculopapular rash with secondary desquamation occurs), and neurological (confusion). 
Brain involvement translates into a significant occupational risk for health care workers, as 
patients may become aggressive. Haemorrhagic manifestations, once considered the hallmark 
of EVD, arise during the peak of the illness in 50 to 70% of patients, and may vary from 
petechiae to multiple foci of mucosal haemorrhage, up to uncontrolled bleeding after 
injections or vessel punctures. In fatal cases, death usually occurs between day 6 and day 16, 
due to a combination of hypovolaemic and septic shock, massive bleeding (typically gastro-
intestinal), and multiorgan failure. 
 
Laboratory abnormalities 
Due to limited access to laboratory tests in involved countries, and the risk associated with 
improper handling of blood samples, less is known on laboratory features of EVD [1, 13]. 
Most patients show early moderate leukopenia, with deep lymphopenia attributed to massive 
apoptosis. Later, neutrophilia, and/or atypical lymphocytes appear. Other common findings 
include moderate thrombocytopenia (50,000-100,000 cells per µL), highly raised liver 
enzymes (especially aspartate aminotransferase), hyperproteinemia (possibly related to 
capillary leak), and prolongation of prothrombin and thromboplastin times, often in the 
context of disseminated intravascular coagulation. No specific abnormalities have been 
reported at later stages, when multiorgan failure ensues. 
  
Differential diagnosis 
The definite EVD diagnosis hinges on detection of viral antigen by enzyme-linked 
immunosorbent assay or viral RNA by polymerase-chain-reaction. IgM and IgG antibodies 
may become positive later in the course of illness. Alternative diagnoses must be carefully 
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considered and ruled out, especially when early treatment may favourably impact prognosis 
(e.g. malaria, any bacterial severe sepsis or septic shock, enteric fever, leptospirosis, 
rickettsiosis, African trypanosomiasis). This is one of the main challenges in the management 
of suspected EVD, as the recommended infection control measures for collecting and 
handling biological specimens may delay necessary laboratory testing (e.g. traditional 
chemistry, hematology, blood cultures, malaria tests, serology), and jeopardize patient care, if 
not promptly performed. Likewise, basic imaging studies (ultrasound, chest X-ray) should not 
be deferred, provided adequate protection is used, so that the necessary process to rule out 
EVD in suspected cases will not translate into a loss of opportunity for those with alternative 
diagnosis. Of note, common detergents and hypochlorite are effective in neutralising Ebola 
virus.      
 
Conclusions 
The 2014 EVD outbreak in West Africa is a public health emergency of international concern 
[6]. Given the extent of this outbreak, and the flow of transcontinental exchanges, every 
physician active in emergency departments or ICU worlwide may turn out to be involved in 
the care of patients suspected of EVD. Take-home messages from this paper, as of August 
2014, are i) suspect EVD in any patient who presents with fever within three weeks after a 
stay in Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, or Nigeria; ii) while implementing infection control 
procedures to prevent any secondary cases (in case EVD is confirmed), ensure that all 
plausible differential diagnoses are appropriately considered and managed.   
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Fig. 1. Distribution of EVD cases (confirmed, probable and suspected) by district in the 
affected countries from December 2013 to 16 August 2014
 
Source: European Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, adapted from National Reports 
and WHO 
(http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/press/news/_layouts/forms/News_DispForm.aspx?List=8db7286c-
fe2d-476c-9133-18ff4cb1b568&ID=1047) 
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